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The turf war between the European Commission and intra-EU BITs: Is an end in sight? 
 
The relationship between intra-EU BITs and the general body of European Union law (acquis 
communautaire) has deteriorated significantly over the past decade due to a number of contested investor-state 
arbitral decisions. These BITs were once a means of promoting investment in the Central and Eastern European 
countries, but following the enlargement of the European Union (EU), a number of these countries joined the 
single market and thus became subject a common legal framework on cross-border investment. A once theoretical 
problem of conflict between EU acquis and international law provisions in intra-EU BITs became a reality due 
to several investor-state cases, in the process challenging the principles of primacy and supremacy of EU acquis. 
The European Commission, often appearing as an amicus curiae before arbitral tribunals and courts, sought to 
reaffirm these fundamental principles, to the objection the arbitral tribunals. As a result, the European 
Commission decided to pursue the policy of compelling EU Member States to terminate their intra-EU BITs as 
well as challenging the enforcement of arbitral awards deemed to be in violation of EU acquis. This paper seeks 
to examine the uneasy relationship between intra-EU BITs and EU acquis to determine whether the European 
Commission’s clampdown on these instruments is justified. With several appeal decisions still pending, the 
authors beg the question; would the call to terminate intra-EU BITs signal the end of a decade-long conflict? 
 
Chrispas Nyombi Tom Mortimer 
1. Conceptual underpinning    
Once a desirable form of European international relations endorsed by the European 
Commission,1 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) became problematic after the accession of 
former socialist countries to the European Union (EU) in May 2004,2 and with the emergence 
of the first intra-EU investment arbitration cases a few years later.3 However, the challenges 
posed by intra-EU BITs had been documented in academic literature decades before the 
enlargement of the EU by the predominantly Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, 
bringing the total number of intra-EU BITs to approximately 190.4 Since 2004, the 
relationship between intra-EU BITs and acquis communautaire (EU acquis hereafter)5 has 
significantly deteriorated, creating another channel of hostility against the institutions of 
international investment law. Outside the EU, international investment law has become 
subject to immense criticism from civil society groups citing a lack of consistency in decision 
making and continued encroachment on national regulatory space. 6 On the latter, developing 
States in Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela), Africa (South Africa) and Asia 
(Indonesia) in particular, have opted to terminate their membership in international 
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1 Before the 2004 wave of accessions, the only intra-EU BITs in force were the Germany-Greece and Germany- Portugal BITs. Both 
agreements were concluded before Greece and Portugal acceded to the EU in 1981 and 1986, respectively. 
2 Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia acceded in 2004, whilst Bulgaria 
and Romania joined the EU in 2007; for commentary see Hanno Wehland, ‘Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitration: Is European 
Community Law an Obstacle?’, 2009, 58(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 297, p. 297; Michele Potestà, ‘Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and the European Union. Recent Developments in Arbitration and Before the ECJ’, 2009, 8(2) The Law & Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals, 225. 
3The conclusion of BITs was generally encouraged throughout the pre-accession period, see Article 76(2) Europe Agreement Establishing 
an Association Between the European Economic Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and Romania, of the Other Part 
signed on 21.12.1993, OJ L 178/76, 12.7.1994; Christer Söderlund, ‘Intra-EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC Treaty’, 2007, 24(5) 
Journal of International Arbitration, 455, p. 456; Marek Wierzbowski and Aleksander Gubrynowicz, ‘Conflict of Norms Stemming From Intra-
EU BITs and EU Legal Obligations: Some Remarks on Possible Solutions’ in Christina Binder and Christoph Schreuer (eds.), International 
Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 544. 
4 See Hanno Wehland, ‘Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitration: Is European Community Law an Obstacle?’, 2009, 58(2) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 297, p. 297.  
5 The accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the body of European Union law. In short; EU acquis.   
6 See Suzanne A Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Agreements’ (2010)13 Journal of 
International Economic Law 1037, 1040; Aikaterini Titi, ‘The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law’ (Hart Publishing, 2014) 
Chapter VII;  Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Do Investment Treaties Unduly Constrain Regulatory Space?’ (2014) Questions of International Law 9, 19; 
Joachim Karl, ‘International Investment Arbitration: A Threat to State Sovereignty?’ in Wenhua Shan, Penelope Simons and Dalvinder 
Singh (eds), ‘Redefining Sovereignty in International Economic Law’ (Hart Publishing, 2008) 225. 
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investment institutions and related agreements.7 However, this discontent has only recently 
started to permeate into the Western hemisphere, igniting withdrawals from the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) by both Italy and Russia.8 In the EU, a power struggle between EU 
acquis and BIT protection rages on, the conclusion of which threatens to redefine the 
established system of international investment law.9 At the forefront of this power struggle 
stands the European Commission, which has championed for EU acquis by appearing as an 
amicus curiae before numerous courts and tribunals on behalf of EU Member States.10  
However, both EU acquis and intra-EU BITs once operated in relative harmony. During the 
1990s, many BITs were agreed between existing members of the EU and the “EU 13” States 
that accessed the single market following the enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013.11 
According to the European Commission, the BITs were aimed at “reassuring investors who 
wanted to invest in the future the ‘EU 13’ at a time when private investors, sometimes for 
historical political reasons, might have felt wary about investing in those countries.”12 These 
BITs offered investors protection on matters such as expropriation without compensation, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET), as well a dispute settlement mechanism mainly in the 
form of international arbitration. The European Commission argues that following the 
enlargements, “such extra reassurances [became] unnecessary” since all 28 Member States 
have the same EU rules on cross-border investments including freedom of establishment and 
the free movement of capital. Intra-EU BITs, on the other hand, confer rights on a bilateral 
basis, which in accordance to EU jurisprudence, amounts to discrimination and thus 
incompatible with EU acquis. The European Commission stepped up its campaign against 
intra-EU BITs in September 2015 by initiating an administrative dialogue with 21 EU 
Member States over the termination of their intra-EU BITs.13 Thus, the European 
Commission is firmly committed to finding a lasting solution to the challenges posed by intra-
EU BITs. 
 
The European Commission’s intentions towards intra-EU BITs were captured in a statement 
by Jonathan Hill, the former EU Commissioner for Financial Services, Financial Stability and 
Capital Markets Union, that: “[i]ntra-EU bilateral investment treaties are outdated and as 
Italy and Ireland have shown by already terminating their intra-EU BITs, no longer 
necessary in a single market of 28 Member States. We must all act together to make sure that 
the regulatory framework for cross-border investment in the single market works effectively. 
In that context, the Commission is ready to explore the possibility of a mechanism for the 
quick and efficient mediation of investment disputes.”14 Thus, this paper is a response to the 
European Commission’s continued intimation that existing intra- EU BITs are incompatible 
with EU acquis and therefore may need to be terminated, a view endorsed by several CEE 
                                                          
7 Louis T Wells, ‘Backlash to Investment Arbitration: Three Causes’, in: Claire Balchin, Liz K Chung, Asha Kaushal and Michael Waibel 
(eds.), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, (Kluwer Law International, 2010) pp. 341–352; Omar E. García-
Bolívar, ‘Sovereignty vs. Investment Protection: Back to Calvo?’ (2009) ICSID Review 24 (2) 464-488; Republic of South Africa, “Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review: Government Position Paper” (June 2009); Michael Ewing-Chow and Juniato Losari, 
‘Indonesia is letting its bilateral treaties lapse so as to renegotiate better ones.’ Financial Times: 15 April 2014.  
8 The Energy Charter Treaty. Concluded in Lisbon, December 17, 1994; Entered into force, April 16, 1998; Jarrod Hepburn and Luke Peterson. 
2 June 2015. “Italy is the EU’s Model Citizen.” IAReporter; Amelia Hadfield & Adnan Amkhan-Banyo, ‘From Russia with Cold Feet: EU-
Russia Energy Relations, and the Energy Charter Treaty’ (2013) 1 International Journal of Energy Security and Environmental Research 1. 
9 They do not concern investment treaties Member States or the European Union may have with third countries for which different 
considerations apply. 
10 See generally Maciej Zachariasiewicz, ‘Amicus curiae in international investment arbitration: can it enhance the transparency of 
investment dispute resolution?’, 2012, 29 J. Int. Arb., 2; Jorge E.Viñuales, ‘Amicus Intervention In Investor-State Arbitration’, 2007, 61 
Disp. Resol. J., 72. 
11 See Christer Söderlund, ‘Intra-EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC Treaty’, 2007, 24(5) Journal of International Arbitration, 455. 
12 European Commission - Press release, Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, Brussels, 
18 June 2015. 
13 The aim was to seek their views on the issue. The other five states were already subject to infringement proceedings and two, Ireland 
(2012) and Italy (2013), had already terminated their intra-EU BITs.  
14 European Commission - Press release, Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, Brussels, 
18 June 2015. 
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Member States and has been argued before several investment tribunals. The aim of this paper 
is to explore whether the European Commission’s position is justified and its implications for 
the future of intra-EU BITs. First and foremost, the paper examines the uneasy relationship 
between EU acquis and international investment law. The goal is to determine where the line 
between the supremacy EU acquis and international law obligations under intra-EU BITs 
has been drawn by international arbitral tribunals. The second aim is to critically examine 
the implications of the on-going legal disputes and terminations of intra-EU BITs for both 
investors and the entire system of international investment law, before reaching a circumspect 
conclusion.   
 
2. The European Commission’s attack on intra-EU BITs 
 
The controversy surrounding the supremacy of EU acquis over international investment law 
gained momentum in 2007 following an International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal award in Micula v. Romania, ordering Romania to 
compensate a foreign investor, the enforcement of which amounting to illegal state aid under 
EU acquis.15 This was accompanied by several tribunal decisions challenging the argument 
that EU acquis superseded international law obligations under intra-EU BITs. For example, 
the arbitral tribunal in AES v. Hungary refused to give EU acquis supremacy over the 
Hungary-UK BIT;16 in Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, the arbitral tribunal rejected the 
argument that EU acquis takes priority over international law obligations in intra-EU 
BITs;17 and the arbitral tribunal in Electrabel v. Hungary upheld its jurisdiction based on the 
ECT provisions.18 Moreover, the issue of compatibility is currently pending before the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on the setting aside proceedings against the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitral award rendered in the Eureko 
v. the Slovak Republic.19  
 
The European Commission responded to the challenges posed by international investment 
law by putting pressure EU Member States to terminate their intra-EU BITs. This advice 
was taken on board by most CEE Member States but the major economic players within the 
EU, namely the Netherlands, France, Germany and the UK opposed the decision.20 The CEE 
Member States maintain that corporations in Western Europe are suing them through a 
network of intra-EU BITs hence the decision to terminate these BITs.21 This argument is 
intertwined with a growing conservatory of literature on the relationship between the 
institutions of international investment law and national sovereignty thus pursuing it is 
somewhat expedient even though more academic attention is needed on the growing 
discontent over investor-state arbitration within the EU. Nonetheless, the European 
                                                          
15 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRL and SC Multipack SRL v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Award 
(11 December 2013). The majority of known cases are handled by the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) in Washington. The second most used rules are those of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) as well as 
the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), both business organisations, 
also regularly handle disputes. 
16 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22. 
17 Eastern Sugar B.V. v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004.  
18 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19. 
19 Eureko. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13; see UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (revised 2010) UN General 
Assembly Resolution (A/RES/31/98). Unlike ICSID and the ICSID Additional Facility, there is no dedicated institution associated with 
the administration of arbitrations pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. However, the parties may agree that the services of an 
institution such as ICSID or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) will be responsible for administering an ad hoc UNCITRAL 
arbitration. 
20 See for example Council of the European Union “2008 Annual EFC Report to the Commission and the Council on the Movement of 
Capital and the Freedom of Payments “(ECOFIN 629 MDC 2, 17363/08) paragraph 17: “Most Member States did not share the 
Commission's concern in respect of arbitration risks and discriminatory treatment of investors and a clear majority of Member States 
preferred to maintain the existing agreements.” 
21 European Commission (2012) Monitoring activities and analysis, Bilateral Investment Treaties between EU Member States (intra-EU 




Commission advances the view that Member States cannot act in a manner that infringes 
their obligations under EU acquis and subject to Article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU, also known as the Treaty of Lisbon), 22 they have an 
obligation to remove any incompatibilities between agreements. However, Article 351 applies 
only to pre-accession thus excluding post-accession treaties. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the CJEU in cases against Finland, Austria and Sweden found that these Member States 
had violated Article 351 by retaining provisions in their extra- EU BITs (BITs with non-EU 
states) that were incompatible with EU acquis.23  
 
However, the legal consequence of incompatibility in the cases against Finland, Austria and 
Sweden are the same for intra- EU BITs. For instance, BIT provisions could lead to 
discriminatory treatment amongst EU Member State nationals by according more favourable 
treatment to investors from a particular Member State. This is because BIT protections are 
granted exclusively to contracting parties thus excluding investors from other non-party 
States, which constitutes a violation of the non-discrimination prohibition under Article 18 
TFEU and a hindrance to the harmonization of EU acquis.24 The European Commission’s 
decision to terminate intra-EU BITs was fuelled by the growing number of cases involving 
alleged breaches of investment treaties by CEE Member States in the process of conforming 
to EU acquis, with several cases touching on intra-EU legal developments.25 These States 
were left in a position of either breaching EU acquis or their BIT obligations. As a result, the 
European Commission decided to intervene in these proceedings as an amicus curiae to support 
the respondent Member State and to promote its position that BIT provisions are in direct 
conflict with EU acquis.26  
 
However, the latter argument has been unanimously rejected by international arbitral 
tribunals by continuously accepting jurisdiction. For example, in Eureko v. The Slovak Republic 
(December 2012 – later Achmea v. The Slovak Republic)27 and Micula v. Romania (December 
2013),28 the European Commission intervened but its arguments were deemed not compelling 
enough to discontinue the proceedings and hand jurisdiction to an EU court or even admit 
absolute primacy of EU acquis over other international obligation of the State. These setbacks 
forced the European Commission to employ the strategy of seeking to set aside international 
arbitral awards deemed to conflict with EU acquis. For example, Eureko went all the way to 
Germany’s Federal Court of Justice (its highest civil and criminal jurisdiction) in Karlsruhe 
where Slovakia and the European Commission managed to obtain the suspension of the 
proceedings, currently awaiting preliminary ruling from the CJEU.29 Similarly, in the Micula 
case, which was undergoing annulment proceedings at ICSID in Washington, the European 
Commission intervened by declaring the payment of award as amounting to illegal state aid.30 
Incompatibility proceedings are pending at the General Court of the European Union. 
 
                                                          
22 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 
O.J. (C 306) 1 of 17 December 2007. 
23 Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria; Case C-249/06 Commission v. Sweden; Case C 118/07, Commission v. Finland; See Freidl Weiss and 
Silke Steiner, ‘The investment regime under Article 207 of the TFEU – a legal conundrum: the scope of ‘foreign direct investment’ and the 
future of intra-EU BITs in Beatens’, Freya (ed), Investment Law within International Law Integrationist Perspectives, Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, pp. 367-368. 
24 See Christopher von Krause, , ‘The European Commission’s Opposition to Intra-EU BITs and its Impact on Investment Arbitration’, 
Kluwer Law International Arbitration Blog, 28 September 2010, at 18 
25 See part 4 below. 
26 See Maciej Zachariasiewicz, ‘Amicus curiae in international investment arbitration: can it enhance the transparency of investment dispute 
resolution?’, 2012, Journal of Int. Arb, 29(2) pp. 2005-224.   
27 Eureko. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic).  
28 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRL and SC Multipack SRL v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/20 (Sweden/Romania BIT), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (September 24, 2008). 
29 Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV.  
30 See the argument of the European Commission in Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRL and SC Multipack 
SRL v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Award (11 December 2013) para 334.  
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As new ISDS cases based on intra-EU BITs mounted, the European Commission decided in 
June 2015 to begin infringement proceedings against five Member States: Austria, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden. The five infringing Member States were chosen 
because they had pending or had been involved in intra-EU BIT disputes. The European 
Commission reaffirmed that intra-EU BITs were outdated, unnecessary within a single 
market governed by EU acquis and not compatible with EU acquis. The European 
Commission also argued that BITs were originally conceived as a political commitment and 
reassurance to EU investors in non-EU European states, and with the accession of these 
States to the single market, they became subject to the entire legal framework that sufficiently 
protects cross-border investment.31 In view of the European Commission, it is unacceptable 
to permit a specific bilateral undertaking between member states to circumvent the entire 
legal framework. The European Commission therefore concluded that the existence of intra-
EU BITs threatens the very fabric of EU acquis by creating contradictions and overlaps with 
mandatory provisions of EU treaties and secondary legislation.  
 
The European Commission’s attack on intra- EU BITs received divergent reactions. 
Denmark launched negotiations in 2016 with its contracting States to terminate its intra- EU 
BITs.32 This was the same position taken by the Czech Republic by terminating all its intra-
EU BITs in 2016.33 Poland went even further by announcing that it would terminate all its 
BITs including extra-EU BITS.34 Romania and Sweden have been negotiating among 
themselves and the European Commission since 2015, with Romania passing a law in March 
2017 to facilitate the outright termination of its intra-EU BITs.35 Sweden, on the other hand, 
the home State in multiple ICSID proceedings against Germany and Poland, has been less 
forthcoming.36 It calls for stronger evidence to support a direct violation of EU acquis by BIT 
provisions (in reference to the Sweden-Romania BIT) and in principle willing to terminate its 
BITs if a similar system of investment protection is provided within the EU.37  
 
Five infringing and non-infringing States (Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) made counterproposals in April 2016 through a ‘Non-Paper’.38 These States 
accept the idea of terminating intra-EU BITs, along with scrapping BIT sunset clauses, which 
prolong the protection granted to investors after the termination of the treaties.39 However, 
similar to Sweden, this is conditional to the development of a replacement multilateral system 
for intra-EU investment protection and dispute settlement.40 On the latter proposal, this 
leaves three alternative solution; i) extending the CJEU’s mandate to include investor-state 
disputes; ii) creating an autonomous body with a competence limited to investor-state 
disputes (such as the proposed investment court under the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement);41 iii) using the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
                                                          
31 European Commission - Press release, Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, Brussels, 
18 June 2015.  
32 Nokos Lavranos ‘The end of intra-EU BITs is nearing’ Practical Arbitration Blog, Thomas Reuters, May 13, 2016. 
33 Angeline Welsh ‘Grappling with jurisdictional issues under the UK-Czech Republic BIT’ The law of nations, May 8, 2017. 
34 Markus Burgstaller, Recognition and Enforcement of ICSID Awards: The ICSID Convention and the European Union, in Crina Baltag 
(ed.), ICSID Convention After 50 Years: Unsettled Issues, 2017, Wolters Kluwer, p. 412.  
35 Crina Baltag, Green Light for Romania to Terminate its Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties, Kluwer Arbitration Blog,14 March 
2017.  
36 Nokos Lavranos ‘The end of intra-EU BITs is nearing’ Practical Arbitration Blog, Thomas Reuters, May 13, 2016. 
37 Joel Dahlquist Cullborg, Hannes Lenk, Love Rönnelid ‘The infringement proceedings over intra-EU investment treaties – an analysis of 
the case against Sweden’ Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Issue 2016:4.  
38 Non-Paper ‘Intra-EU Investment Treaties: Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands’ dated 7 April 2016. 
For commentary, see Vanessa Naish & Elizabeth Reeves ‘The future of ISDS in the EU: leaked non-paper reveals proposal for EU-wide 
investment agreement’ Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, 31 May 2016. 
39 Non-Paper ‘Intra-EU Investment Treaties: Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands’ dated 7 April 2016, 
p3-5. 
40 Non-Paper ‘Intra-EU Investment Treaties: Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands’ dated 7 April 2016, 
p.2.  
41 European Commission, EU-Canada CETA http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter (Accessed 10 May 
2017); See Vanessa Naish & Elizabeth Reeves ‘The future of ISDS in the EU: leaked non-paper reveals proposal for EU-wide investment 
agreement’ Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, 31 May 2016. 
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Hague through a custom-made procedural framework. Thus, these States are willing to retain 
the investment protection regime but with a dispute settlement mechanism that recognises 
the supremacy of EU acquis. However, the ‘Non-Paper’ failed to create the intended unifying 
effect across the EU and the European Commission maintained that EU acquis already offered 
sufficient investment protection. The arbitration community was also critical of the proposal 
to forgo with sunset clauses in an attempt to speedily abrogate BIT protection, which goes 
against the spirit of international law and established norms.42 
 
Despite that, the European Commission is empowered to bring infringement provisions 
against nonconforming Member States in a bid to remove intra-EU BITs. The European 
Commission’s authority over BITs entered into by EU Member States stems largely from the 
Treaty of Lisbon (the TFEU), which came into force on 1 December 2009, granting the EU 
exclusive competence over Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as part of its Common 
Commercial Policy.43 This meant the power to negotiate and conclude extra-EU BITs shifted 
from Member States to the EU (mainly the European Commission).44 Thus, Member States 
need authorisation from the European Commission for any new extra- EU BITs.45 This was 
followed by Regulation 1219/201246 establishing transitional arrangements for existing 
extra-EU BITs, enabling them to remain in force until they are replaced by treaties concluded 
by the European Commission.47 The Council of the European Union assured EU investors 
that the new legal framework would not affect the commitments and protections they enjoy 
under existing extra-EU BITs.48  
 
However, the scope of the EU’s competence over FDI remains in a balance; with the European 
Commission interpreting it as not limited to access and admission questions but also pre- 
establishment requirements and post-establishment investment protection, including the 
mode of dispute settlement whether state-to-state or investor-to-state.49 The scope of EU’s 
competence over investment has also divided opinion amongst academics, particularly in 
relation to the future of EU BITs. On one hand, academics interpret the EU’s competence on 
existing extra-EU BITs to extend to the termination and introduction of new progressive 
                                                          
42 Agnieszka Zarowna, ‘Termination of BITs and Sunset Clauses- What can investors in Poland expect?’  Kluwer Arbitration Blog, February 
28, 2017. 
43 Articles 206 and 207 of the TFEU on EU’s new competence to conclude agreements with third states with respect to trade and FDI. 
After the Lisbon Treaty, Article 206 TFEU read as follows: “By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the 
Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers. [emphasis added]” Article 207(1): “The 
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff 
and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, 
the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the 
event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the 
Union’s external action.” 
44 August Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path – Quo vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other Investment Agreements’, 
(2014) Santa Clara Journal of International Law, Volume12(1), p. 114; Ahmad Ghouri, ‘Interaction and Conflict of Treaties in Investment 
arbitration, International Arbitration Law Library, Kluwer Law International, 2015, p. 149.  
45 Ana Stanič, ‘Chapter I: The Arbitration Agreement and Arbitrability, EU Law: Deterring Energy Investments and a Source of Friction’, 
in Gerold Zeiler , Irene Welser , et al. (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2015, p. 33.  
46 Regulation (EU) No1219/2012 (2012) OJ L 351, of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 12 2012, establishing 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries. 
47 Stephan Wilske, Lars Markert & Laura Bräuningeret, ‘Chapter IV: Investment Arbitration, Pertinent Issues in Investment Arbitration 
against Romania: A Case Study in Challenges and Pitfalls of Investment Disputes in Central and Eastern Europé, in Zeiler, Gerold, Welser, 
Irene, et al. (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration, 2015, p. 499. 
48 Council of the European Union, ‘Conclusions on a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy’, 2041st Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 25 October 2010, paragraph 9; Freidl Weiss and Silke Steiner, ‘The investment regime under Article 207 
of the TFEU – a legal conundrum: the scope of ‘foreign direct investment’ and the future of intra-EU BITs in Beatens’, Freya (ed), Investment 
Law within International Law Integrationist Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 366.  
49 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, ’Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy’, COM (2010) 343 final, p. 2; August Reinisch, ‘The 
EU on the Investment Path – Quo vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other Investment Agreements’, (2014) Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law, Volume 12(1), p. 118. 
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agreements relating to the same subject matter.50 This view is supported by a number of EU 
Member States that have intimated on terminating their BITs.51 On the other hand, academic 
commentators argue that the purpose of the EU’s competence is to create a uniform foreign 
investment regime, limited to new agreements only thus not empowering the European 
Commission to renegotiate or terminate exiting Member State BITs.52 This view was 
reflected in a 2008 Annual Economic and Financial Committee Report, stating that a majority 
of Member States were against the termination of intra-EU BITs.53 Despite that, the 
European Commission has been actively exercising and defending this authority in numerous 
court and arbitral proceedings.   
 
3. Two captains on the same ship:  CJEU verses international arbitral tribunals  
 
Most interestingly, for the purposes of understanding the controversy surrounding intra-EU 
BITs, is the relationship between the CJEU and international arbitral tribunals. Most BITs 
expressly refer to international arbitration as the main dispute resolution method available to 
foreign investors. In intra-EU BITs, this may constitute a violation of Article 344 TFEU 
which states that: “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for therein.” In that vein, international arbitral tribunals constitute a threat to the 
exclusive competence of the CJEU and their inclusion in intra-EU BITs goes against the 
explicit prohibition in Article 344 against Member States to choosing other forums to settle 
their EU-based disputes. These issues came before the CJEU following infringement 
proceedings brought by European Commission against Ireland (MOX plant case) for initiating 
international arbitral proceedings against the United Kingdom under the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention.54 The CJEU found that the issues fell within its exclusive 
jurisdiction because it involved the interpretation and application of EU acquis.55 It therefore 
held that: “an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of responsibilities defined 
in the treaties and, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system, compliance 
with which the Court ensures… The act of submitting a dispute of this nature to a judicial 
forum such as the Arbitral Tribunal involves the risk that a judicial forum other than the 
Court will rule on the scope of obligation imposed on the Member States pursuant to 
Community law.”56 This means that international arbitral tribunals are denied jurisdiction to 
rule on questions on application and interpretation of EU acquis, in particular, if and to what 
extent, EU acquis should be applied.57  
 
The CJEU’s decision in MOX Plant was in reference to inter-state disputes (between two 
Member States) and subject to Article 344, Member States as opposed to investors are 
permitted to submit a dispute to the CJEU.  However, the mere fact Article 344 does not 
                                                          
50 Ana Stanič, ‘Chapter I: The Arbitration Agreement and Arbitrability, EU Law: Deterring Energy Investments and a Source of Friction’, 
in Gerold Zeiler , Irene Welser , et al. (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2015, p. 33; See also Recital 5 to the Regulation 
(EU) No. 1219/2012 (2012) OJ L 351. 
51 Freidl Weiss and Silke Steiner, ‘The investment regime under Article 207 of the TFEU – a legal conundrum: the scope of ‘foreign direct 
investment’ and the future of intra-EU BITs in Beatens’, Freya (ed), Investment Law within International Law Integrationist Perspectives, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 372. 
52 Ahmad Ghouri, ‘Interaction and Conflict of Treaties in Investment arbitration, International Arbitration Law Library, Kluwer Law 
International, 2015, p. 151. 
53 Council of the European Union “2008 Annual EFC Report to the Commission and the Council on the Movement of Capital and the 
Freedom of Payments “(ECOFIN 629 MDC 2, 17363/08) paragraph 17 “Most Member States did not share the Commission's concern in 
respect of arbitration risks and discriminatory treatment of investors and a clear majority of Member States preferred to maintain the 
existing agreements.” 
54 Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (MOX plant), [2006] ECR I-4657. 
55 August Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path – Quo vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other Investment Agreements’, 
(2014) Santa Clara Journal of International Law, Volume 12(1), p. 152-153. 
56 Commission v. Ireland (MOX plant), para. 177. 
57 Freidl Weiss and Silke Steiner, ‘The investment regime under Article 207 of the TFEU – a legal conundrum: the scope of ‘foreign direct 
investment’ and the future of intra-EU BITs in Beatens’, Freya (ed), Investment Law within International Law Integrationist Perspectives, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 368. 
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apply to disputes between private parties does not exclude it from a dispute between a private 
party and a Member State party.58 Thus, the CJEU might find international arbitral 
proceedings incompatible if they concern questions of EU acquis. Furthermore, investor-state 
arbitral tribunals convened under intra-EU BITs deprive Member States of their right under 
Article 267 TFEU to request preliminary rulings from the CJEU, and they cannot exercise 
public authority on behalf of Member States, again encumbering the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the court. Clearly, the CJEU is threatened by international dispute settlement mechanisms 
that could interpret EU acquis without referring the questions to it for interpretation.  
 
However, upholding the principles of primacy and supremacy of EU acquis, without any 
qualification, could limit or even take away investors rights under a BIT, by allowing a 
Member State to breach its obligations under international law and justify it with reference 
to EU obligations. This would constitute a breach of party intentions, and it is especially the 
case for new EU Member States, who amend their laws in order to accede to the EU. Viewed 
in a different light; if an African Union (AU) Member State decides to justify breach of BIT 
obligations with reference to AU law, against the interests of a foreign investor from an EU 
Member State, would such a decision be well received or enforced within the EU? Most likely 
not. Despite that, the European Commission has argued for the termination of intra-EU BITs 
citing principles of primacy and supremacy of EU acquis.  
 
To determine which system of law has priority, it is imperative to examine the customary 
international law position on termination of treaties found under Articles 59 and 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties.59 As aforementioned, investment tribunals have 
rejected the argument that intra-EU BITs have become ineffective due to the EU’s 
competence over FDI, thus maintaining their BIT-based jurisdiction which could lead to 
conflict with EU acquis. Article 59 states that: “[a] treaty shall be considered as terminated 
if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter and: (a) it 
appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the 
matter should be governed by that treaty; or (b) the provisions of the later treaty are so far 
incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied 
at the same time.” In order for Article 59 VCLT to apply, both the TFEU and BIT must be 
incompatible and relate to the same subject matter. Thus, BITs are not automatically 
terminated by a state’s accession to the TFEU, and tribunals have been consistent in rejecting 
the view that BITs and EU acquis relate to the same subject matter despite the similarities in 
the some of the provisions. This is because the protection under EU acquis is regarded as not 
as far-reaching as that under BITs since the TFEU does not provide for the FET standard, 
an expropriation provision or investor-state arbitration.  
 
Even though BITs provide more protection than EU acquis, that does not make them 
incompatible. As stated by the tribunal in Eureko, “the later treaty must have more than a 
minor or incidental overlap with the earlier treaty” thus, substantive similarity is required.60 
However, the overlap could be considered as more than minor as most BIT protections such 
as non-discrimination, prohibition against expropriation without compensation, promotion of 
investment and general FET treatment can be found in EU acquis, but less than substantive. 
This is because there is a difference in the purpose of the treaties as EU protection primarily 
                                                          
58 Mark Clodfelter, ‘The Future Direction of Investment Agreements in the European Union’, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 
Volume 12(1), 2014, p. 179. 
59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331; VCLT hereafter) 
The VCLT applies only to treaties between States. Agreements involving international organizations are governed by the Vienna 
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March 1986, not yet in force) [1986] 25 ILM 543. The first 72 Articles of the 1986 VCLT—regarded as reflecting customary international 
law— address the same subjects as Articles 1- 72 of the original VCLT, which this the focus of this paper.  




covers the pre-establishment stage of investment, as in access to other Member State markets, 
as opposed to BIT protections which mainly cover post-investment protection such as 
expropriation protection and investor-state arbitration.61 Article 59 also requires intention to 
terminate the BITs or be superseded by EU acquis, expressed either in the BIT or the TFEU, 
thus mere accession does not constitute intent. On that background, the mere fact a BIT 
provides differential treatment does not make it incompatible; intra-EU BITs and EU acquis 
can co-exist and the differences can be overcome by offering the same protection in all 
Member States throughout the EU.62  
 
If a treaty is not terminated then Article 30 VCLT on the priority between an earlier and 
later treaty would apply: “1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject 
matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs. 2. When a treaty 
specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier 
or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail. 3. When all the parties to the earlier 
treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended 
in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions 
are compatible with those of the latter treaty. 4. When the parties to the later treaty do not 
include all the parties to the earlier one: (a) as between States parties to both treaties the same 
rule applies as in paragraph 3; (b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party 
to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual 
rights and obligations.” Thus, if an earlier treaty (a pre- accession BIT) is not terminated 
pursuant to Article 59 VCLT, then its provisions are applicable insofar as they conform with 
the later treaty (TFEU).  It means individual BIT provisions would become inapplicable if 
they are incompatible with the TFEU. This renders investor-state arbitration provisions in 
intra-EU BITs inapplicable since they are incompatible with EU acquis.  
 
However, this argument has been rejected by tribunals (Eureko and Eastern Sugar), stating 
that no incompatibility could arise if the obligations under the earlier BIT could be fulfilled 
without violating the later EU acquis. Furthermore, the tribunals argued that the 
incompatibility and inapplicability arguments lacked merit since there is no norm of EU 
acquis prohibiting investor-state arbitration and since EU acquis does not provide a dispute 
settlement provision that allows investors to bring proceedings against Member States before 
the CJEU or arbitral tribunals, then investor-state arbitration in BITs can be invoked by 
investors without breaching EU acquis.63 Thus, despite the overlap, BIT protection is more 
extensive as compared to EU acquis, hence supporting their parallel application. The 
relationship between EU acquis and intra-EU BITs was explored in landmark cases against 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania, with the latter two countries thereafter deciding 
to terminate their BITs. 
 
4. A counterattack from the arbitral tribunals  
 
                                                          
61 August Reinisch, ‘Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Action – The Decisions on Jurisdiction in the 
Eastern Sugar and Eureko Investment Arbitrations’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, (2012) Kluwer Law International, 39(2), p. 167. 
62 Member States are not prevented – through national law or international agreements – from enacting more favourable provisions for 
investors than those available under EU law. August Reinisch, ‘Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 
Action – The Decisions on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko Investment Arbitrations’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, (2012) 
Kluwer Law International, 39(2), p. 78; Hanno Wehland, ‘Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitration: Is European Community Law 
an Obstacle?’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 297, 310.  
63 EU law does, however, provide rules to protect property rights of EU nationals from interference by EU measures. Angelos Dimopoulos, 
‘The Validity and Applicability of International Investment Agreements Between EU Member States under EU and International Law’, 
2011, Common Market Law Review, 63, p. 64–65; Indeed, the CJEU in Kadi (Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paras. 
354 and 355), and before that in Bosphorus (Case C-84/95, EU:C:1996:312, paras. 19 and 20), acknowledged the recognition of a right to 




The relationship between EU acquis and intra-EU BITs was first debated in investor-state 
arbitral proceedings involving Eastern Sugar v Czech Republic.64 A Dutch foreign investor 
claimed that Czech Republic had breached the FET standard under the Czech-Netherlands 
BIT by enacting three pricing decrees. The respondent State argued that; i) the enactment of 
the decrees was a mandatory requirement under EU acquis; ii) they were necessary to meet 
the non-discrimination requirement under Article 18 FTEU; iii) EU acquis obligations 
superseded those under international investment treaties.65 The respondent State also 
referred to Article 59 VCLT, arguing that both treaties address the same subject matter, and 
since the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU in 2004, the relevant BIT became 
inapplicable.66 The Czech Republic quoted a January 2006 letter from the European 
Commission stating:  “where the EC Treaty or secondary legislation are in conflict with some 
of these BITs’ provisions…. Community legislation will automatically prevail over the 
nonconforming BIT provisions” and “intra-EU BITs should be terminated in so far as the 
matters under the agreements fall under Community competence.”67 In other words, dispute 
settlement provisions under the BIT could be utilised by Member States, after their accession 
to the EU, if the claim fell within EU competence. As a result, the respondent State argued 
that the claim should be resolved under EU acquis based on the principle that EU acquis takes 
precedence from a Member State’s date of accession. And although the arbitral clause under 
the BIT would still be in force, it would only apply to disputes that occurred before the 
Member State’s accession to the EU.68  
 
Furthermore, the Czech republic referred to a note by the European Commission to the 
Economic and Financial Committee that the dispute settlement provisions in BITs could lead 
to arbitration taking place without relevant questions of [EU] law being submitted to the 
[CJEU], with unequal treatment of investors among Member States as a possible outcome” 
and urged Member States to “formally rescind such agreements.”69 Based on these 
submissions, the Czech Republic argued that its obligations under the BIT were superseded 
by obligations under EU acquis on the date of its accession to the TFEU.70  The Czech 
Republic added that “a member state may not exercise rights granted under an earlier 
agreement to the extent that such exercise conflicts with obligations under [TFEU] treaty”. 
In summary, the respondent State claimed that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the matter 
which, based on the evidence submitted, belonged to the CJEU and the BIT was 
inapplicable.71  
 
However, each of the respondent State’s submissions were rejected by the arbitral tribunal. 
First, the tribunal found one of the three decrees to amount to a breach the FET standard 
and rejected the view that the non-discrimination principle under Article 18 TFEU could be 
used to justify breach of the BIT. Secondly, the tribunal stipulated that for Article 59 VCLT 
to apply, the treaties must deal with the same subject matter and be incompatible. The 
tribunal found that despite a number of similarities, the most fundamental provisions provided 
under the BIT such as the FET, compensated expropriation and a dispute settlement 
mechanism were not reflected under EU acquis on cross-border investment protection.72 
According to the tribunal, the fact that BIT rights to Dutch investors were not available to 
                                                          
64 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, Partial award, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) no. 088/2004 (Mar. 27, 
2007). The arbitration was conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules. 
65 George A. Bermann, ‘Navigating EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration’, (2012) Arbitration International, 28(3), p. 429. 
66 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, paras. 100-101. 
67 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, para. 119.  
68 Markus Burgstaller, ‘European Law and Investment Treaties’, Journal of International Arbitration, (2009) Kluwer Law International, 26(2), 
p. 185; Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, para 119. 
69 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, para. 126. 
70 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, para. 126. 
71 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, paras. 186; 109; 130-139. 
72 George A. Bermann, ‘Navigating EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration’, (2012) Arbitration International, 28(3), p. 433; Eastern 
Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, paras. 159-160; 164-165 & 167-168. 
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other EU investors did not make the rights incompatible with EU acquis, as other countries 
and investors are entitled to also claim their rights.73 Second, the tribunal argued that the 
BIT was not superseded by EU acquis, because neither the BIT nor TFEU explicitly 
mentions it thus failing to meet the requirements under Article 59 VCLT.74 Thus, the Czech 
Republic’s mere accession to the EU did not automatically mean the BIT was superseded and 
by virtual of it being in force, jurisdiction remained with the arbitral tribunals.75 The tribunal 
did not address Article 30 VCLT which looks at the application of treaties relating to the 
same subject matter and inconsistent obligations because it had already established that the 
BIT was still in force and not terminated as required under Article 59 VCLT.76  Last but not 
least, the tribunal rejected the argument that the CJEU held a monopoly over the 
interpretation of EU acquis by virtue of having jurisdiction as conferred by the BIT.77 
 
The tribunal in Eastern Sugar rejected the argument that EU acquis has primacy over 
international law obligations under BIT thus setting a precedent for future tribunals. The 
next landmark case involved Eureko, a Dutch foreign investor, who commenced arbitral 
proceedings under the Netherlands-Czechoslovakia BIT claiming that Slovakia had indirectly 
expropriated its assets and denied it FET.78 The European Commission joined Slovakia 
through its amicus curiae79 to express objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and advance 
the argument that the BIT and TFEU governed the same subject matter thus it should have 
been made inapplicable by virtue of Articles 30 and 59 VCLT or terminated when Slovakia 
accessed the EU in 2004. Furthermore, the respondent State claimed that since its accession 
to the EU, the CJEU obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the investor’s claim.80 The 
respondent State also challenged the parallel application of EU acquis and intra-EU BITs 
citing supremacy of EU acquis, which “enables EU law to supersede the legal systems of its 
Member States, including bilateral treaties concluded between Member States.”81 The 
European Commission agreed with Slovakia’s arguments, stating that: “as a result of the 
supremacy of EU acquis vis-á-vis pre-accession treaties between Member States, conflicts 
between BIT provisions and EU acquis cannot be resolved by interpreting and applying the 
relevant EU acquis provisions in the light of the BIT.”82 In essence, the European Commission 
was arguing that international law cannot be used to justify breach of EU acquis. Thus, as 
with national law which is incompatible with EU acquis, intra-EU BIT provisions that are 
incompatible with EU acquis would not be invalid but simply inapplicable.83  
 
The tribunal rejected the challenge to its jurisdiction presented by the respondent State and 
the European Commission in relation to the displacement of BIT provisions with EU acquis. 
First, the tribunal argued that the BIT provisions still applied because it had not been 
disapplied by EU acquis pursuant to Article 30 VCLT. The tribunal therefore concluded that 
“the VCLT does not provide for the automatic termination of treaties by operation of law.”84 
Second, the tribunal did not find any incompatibilities between the BIT and EU acquis 
prohibiting investor-state arbitration, thereby holding that it cannot be assumed that all 
arbitration that involve any question of EU acquis are conducted in violation of EU acquis. 
                                                          
73 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, para. 170. 
74 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, paras. 143-175. 
75 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, paras. 172 and 181. 
76 Markus Burgstaller, ‘European Law and Investment Treaties’, Journal of International Arbitration, (2009) Kluwer Law International, 26(2), 
p. 187-188. 
77 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, para. 134. 
78 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, PCA Case No. 
2008-13, Oct. 26, 2010.  
79 European Commission Observations, dated July 7, 2010, cited in Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, para. 180. 
80 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, para. 19 and 59. 
81 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, para. 135. 
82 European Commission Observations, dated 7 July 2010, cited in Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, para. 180. 
83 European Commission Observations, dated 7 July 2010, cited in Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, para. 193. 
84 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, para. 235. 
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Furthermore, the tribunal observed that if a BIT obligation could be carried out without 
breaching EU acquis this invalidates the incompatibility argument. On the issue of access to 
dispute settlement being discriminatory, the tribunal argued that it could be easily avoided 
by affording the same rights to all Member States rather than terminating them.85  
 
Thirdly, the tribunal did not regard the BIT and TFEU as covering the same subject matter 
because the protection under the BIT was deemed to be “at least potentially, broader than 
those available under EU acquis (or, indeed, under the laws of any EU Member State)” hence 
the inapplicability of Article 59 VCLT on treaty termination.86 This is because no specific 
FET standard was established in EU acquis and expropriation protection not covered in the 
freedom of establishment.87 Furthermore, there was no evidence of intention from the parties 
that the BIT or its provisions should be displaced with the later treaty, the TFEU. Thus, the 
tribunal found that the BIT and TFEU dealt with different subject matters, despite a number 
of overlaps which were not relevant to the claim, thereby upholding the validity of the BIT 
and justifying its jurisdiction in the matter.  
 
However, the tribunal recognised that BITs tend to grant broader protection as compared to 
that under EU treaties which could lead to more favourable treatment of some Member State 
investors thereby violating the prohibition on discrimination under EU acquis.88 However, 
this does not invalidate the investors’ rights under the BIT since the parties had consented to 
arbitration via the treaty and consent was obtained before their accession to the EU. Despite 
that, the tribunal accepted that EU acquis could influence the scope of the rights and 
obligations under the BIT as applicable law. Furthermore, the tribunal asserted that its 
jurisdiction was limited to alleged breach of BIT provisions not breach of EU acquis.89  The 
tribunal, however, rejected the argument that the CJEU has exclusive right to interpret EU 
acquis since courts and arbitral tribunals through the EU had such a right. Rather, the 
tribunal observed that the CJEU had “monopoly on the final and authoritative interpretation 
of EU acquis” and not even Member State final courts are obligated to refer all questions of 
interpretation of EU acquis to the CJEU.90 In addition, the tribunal rejected the position in 
MOX Plant as relevant to disputes between two contracting parties rather than a contracting 
State and an investor thus limiting the CJEU’s jurisdiction over all such disputes.91 The State 
accompanied by the European Commission challenged the award, and currently awaiting the 
outcome in Slovak Republic v. Achmea (Eureko) before the German Federal court of justice.  
 
Another landmark dispute over the relationship between EU acquis and intra-EU BITs 
surfaced in the case of Electrabel S.A v. Republic of Hungary following the privatisation of the 
country’s energy power sector.92 A foreign investor in Hungary brought arbitral proceedings 
under the ECT claiming breach of the FET standard and expropriation for terminating the 
power purchase agreement (PPA) between the parties. The decision to terminate the PAA 
was a result of a resolution by the European Commission in 2008 advising Hungary that it 
was violating Article 107 TFEU by providing illegal state aid to its power companies.93 In 
                                                          
85 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, para. 274. 
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90  Philip Strik, ‘Shaping the Single European Market in the Field of Foreign Direct Investment, Hart Publishing, London, 2014, p. 246; Eureko 
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its defence, Hungary terminated the PAA in order to conform to EU acquis. As in Eureko and 
Eastern Sugar, the jurisdiction of the tribunal was questioned with the European Commission 
intervening as amicus curiae to uphold the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU with reference 
to the MOX Plant case.94 However, the jurisdiction argument was rejected by the tribunal 
pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement in the ECT.95  
 
Furthermore, the European Commission argued that in the case of incompatibility, EU acquis 
obligations should take priority over the ECT.96 The tribunal did not find any 
incompatibilities and argued that if any had arisen, there would be no justification for treating 
international rules and principles in arbitration as less important than EU acquis. However, 
unlike in Eureko and Eastern Sugar, the tribunal recognised that EU acquis is considered as 
“facts” by the respondent State because of its supremacy in national legal systems of the 
Member states, thus where possible, “the ECT should be interpreted… in harmony with EU 
acquis.” 97 The tribunal therefore concluded that “foreign investors in EU Member States, 
including Hungary, cannot have acquired any legitimate expectations that the ECT would 
necessarily shield their investments from the effects of EU acquis as regards anti-competitive 
conduct.”98 Furthermore, the tribunal stated that “from whatever perspective the relationship 
between the ECT and EU acquis is examined… EU acquis would prevail over the ECT in 
case of any material inconsistency” between two EU Member States.99 Although it was in 
reference to the ECT, the tribunal’s reasoning on the relationship between the ECT and EU 
acquis could arguably be applied to intra-EU BITs, to determine rights in rem and the 
interpretation of the investment agreement.100 However, interpreting the ECT in harmony 
in EU acquis could limit the protection provided under the ECT by allowing Member States 
to justify breaching international obligations under BITs by referring to the obligation to 
change their domestic law, as in Electrabel, emanating from EU acquis.  
 
The EU commission’s inability to defend the supremacy of EU acquis in international arbitral 
tribunals forced it to embark on its second strategy of challenging the enforcement of awards 
deemed to be in violation of EU acquis.  
 
5. EU acquis and the enforcement of intra-EU BIT-based arbitral awards  
 
The relationship between EU acquis and intra-EU BITs is also complicated in regard to 
enforcement of the final award. The fundamental provisions of the Washington Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between investors and states (ICSID Convention), 
namely Articles 53 and 54, require immediate and unconditional recognition and enforcement 
of ICSID awards amongst all its Contracting Parties.101 However, what if the recognition and 
enforcement of an ICSID tribunal award or any rendered by other arbitral tribunals such as 
the International Chamber of Commerce, constitutes a breach of a Member State’s obligations 
under EU acquis? Based on EU acquis and its principles of primacy and supremacy, the 
enforcement would not be permissible thus creating a standoff between EU acquis and an 
international convention.  
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There are two schools of thought on the issue of enforcement of intra-EU BITs with 
compelling arguments that make compromise illusive. On one hand, advocates of BIT 
supremacy argue that an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is established on the basis of an intra- 
EU BITs provisions rather than EU acquis, thus there is no fundamental conflict over 
jurisdiction. This is why investors have been successful in suing EU Member States for breach 
of BIT provisions.102  On the other hand, the European Commission along with a number EU 
Member States advance the thesis that intra-EU BITs are irreconcilable with EU acquis thus 
investors should be denied their treaty-based right of bringing investor-state arbitral 
claims.103 According to the principle of primacy, EU acquis supersedes national law that is 
inconsistent with it meaning that national courts and legislators are prohibited from applying 
laws that are inconsistent with EU acquis.104  
 
However, these conflicting interpretations are not healthy for the growth international 
investment law, a system still in its infancy and one that has recently come under a wave of 
criticism. Thus, the EU’s detachment from international investment law threatens to create 
two systems of interpretation, in the process adding a further layer of complexity and 
confusion.  For instance, if there is a conflict between EU acquis and an intra-EU BIT, the 
courts of an EU Member State and the CJEU would assess the conflict from a different 
perspective to the arbitral tribunals.105 They would treat EU acquis as a supreme and 
autonomous legal order thus taking precedence over both national and international law 
between EU Member States.106 This means the conflict between a BIT and EU acquis would 
be resolved in accordance with EU acquis rather than international law as prescribed in the 
BIT.107 Conversely, an arbitral tribunal would first apply the BIT provisions invoked by the 
investor, then it would deal with the conflict of norms between the BIT and EU treaties, in 
accordance with the relevant principles of international law.108 This limits the relevance of 
EU acquis to treaty-based tribunals to instances where international law so provides, and 
potentially as part of the domestic law of the host State, for instance, on the question of 
property rights, and as the law of the lex loci arbitri, if the seat of arbitration is in an EU 
Member State.109 Thus, a conflict between EU acquis and an intra-EU BIT might not be 
assessed in a similar manner by EU judicial institutions and international arbitral tribunals.  
 
This difference in interpretation could lead to a situation where an EU Member State resists 
payment of an international arbitral award on the basis that EU acquis prevents payment of 
such an award. Even the European Commission could step in to stop a Member State from 
                                                          
102 See Binder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction (6 June 2007), para 63; Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v Slovak 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction (30 April 2010) para 87.  
103 See European Commission Decision 2015/1470 (30 March 2015), para 128. In June 2015, the European Commission started infringement 
proceedings under Article 258 TFEU against five Member States (Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden) for not having 
terminated their intra-EU BITs. 
104 Bruno de Witte, , Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order, in Craig, Paul and de Búrca, Grainne, The evolution of EU 
law, 2nd eds, Oxford University press, 2011, p. 340-341. 
105 See also Electrabel SA v Republic of Hungary, paras 4.112, 4.117; Christian Tietje and Clemens Wackernagel, ‘Enforcement of Intra-EU 
ICSID Awards’ (2015) 16 Journal of World Investment & Trade 205, 207.  
106 See Case C-6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
107 See the argument of the European Commission in Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRL and SC Multipack 
SRL v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Award (11 December 2013) para 334.  
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Tribunal as a fact, always taking into account that a state may not invoke its domestic law as an excuse for alleged breaches of its 
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109 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, para 225: “The Tribunal cannot derive any part of its jurisdiction or authority from EU acquis as such: 
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paying an award which constitutes a violation of EU acquis. And if the award is not paid 
voluntarily, the investor could pursue its enforcement either in the respondent State, in a 
third State or even in another EU Member State (see Micula v. Romania below). If one would 
apply the EU acquis approach, a national court faced with the issue of enforcing an intra-EU 
arbitral award that is not in conformity with EU acquis would be obligated to give precedence 
to EU acquis and not enforce the conflicting award. Furthermore, Article 351 TFEU 
obligates Member States to remove provisions from their agreements with third States that 
are inconsistent with EU acquis. This has been reaffirmed by the CJEU with regards to 
Member State extra-EU BITs concluded before their accession to the EU.  
 
The procedural difficulties that could arise from enforcement of arbitral awards that may be 
deemed in violation of EU acquis were considered in Micula v Romania, another landmark 
case.110 A dispute arose out of investment in Romania’s food production sector made by three 
Swedish companies in the 1990s.111 At a time of investing, they relied on legislative incentives 
(legitimate expectation) in the form of custom duties and profit tax exemptions granted to 
investors as means of attracting foreign investment.112 Romania had committed itself to 
continuing with the incentives until 2009.113 In 2004, Romania revoked these incentives in 
order to conform to EU acquis requirements on State aid in its preparation to join the EU.114 
In 2005, the investors commended ICSID proceedings under the Romania- Sweden BIT for 
breach of their treaty rights.115 The European Commission intervened as amicus curiae to 
support the argument that the revocation of the incentives was an EU acquis requirement 
and any award for damages given to the claimant would constitute illegal state aid under 
Article 107(1) of the TFEU and thus unenforceable.116 Despite the European Commission’s 
argument, the tribunal held that the withdrawal of the incentives amounted to breach of the 
FET provision in the BIT and awarded the investor damages of approximately 180 million 
Euros.117  
 
Romania challenged the final award leading to several new proceedings involving the 
European Commission on the payment, enforcement and annulment of the award.118 First, in 
2014 Romania offset taxes owed by one of the claimants to an amount approximately 80 
million euros against part of the award.119 In the same year, other claimants sought to enforce 
the award against Romania by applying to a Bucharest court of first instance for a decision 
on the execution of the award pursuant to Article 54 of the ICSID Convention.120 
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Subsequently, an executor was appointed and assets worth approximately 10 million Euros 
were seized for distribution to the claimants from the Romanian Ministry of Finance.121  The 
Bucharest Court of Appeal subsequently stayed the enforcement proceedings, and Romania 
passed a law suspending all enforcement action and paid the remaining amount into an escrow 
account in the name of the claimants. The claimants could only withdraw the money if the 
European Commission decided that doing so would be compatible with the internal market 
rules.122 In response, the European Commission invoked Article 11(1) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 659/1999 in May 2014 by issuing an injunction against Romania ordering them to 
suspend payment of the award until it had made a final decision on the compatibility of the 
payments with EU acquis.123 This decision was challenged by the claimants before the 
European General Court but the proceedings were subsequently discontinued at the 
claimants’ request in February 2016.124 Following the formal state aid proceedings against 
Romania brought by the European Commission, in March 2015 it reached a final decision 
that payment of the award would amount to illegal state aid and for Romania recover sums 
already paid.125 The claimants have challenged the decision before the General Court and the 
decision is pending.126  
 
Parallel to these proceedings, Romania commended annulment proceedings at ICSID under 
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention in April 2014 and requested that the enforcement of the 
award should be stayed pending the outcome of the proceedings before the General Court of 
the EU.127 The ICSID ad hoc annulment committee indicated to Romania that it would only 
stay the enforcement if the State unconditionally commits to paying the award if the 
annulment application was not successful.128 Following the decision from the European 
Commission that the payments would constitute illegal state aid in March 2015,129 Romania 
informed the annulment committee that it would not make a commitment towards paying the 
award,130 and the ad hoc committee proceeded to make a decision.131 Subsequently, the 
claimants approached the US District Court for the Southern District of New York to enforce 
the award. In April 2015, a decision granting ex parte confirmation and conversion of the 
award into a US judgment was rendered.132 Romania was unable to convince the District 
court to overturn its ruling and opted instead to launch an appeal before the US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.133 The European Commission intervened as an amicus curiae 
in both the District Court and Court of Appeals proceedings, with the latter decision still 
pending.134 On the whole, this case highlights the complexities surrounding enforcement 
where an international arbitral decision conflicts with EU acquis. In wake of this protracted 
enforcement dispute, it is worth asking; is there is a future for intra-EU BITs?  
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6. Is there a future for intra-EU BITs? 
The short answer is yes; if a compromise could be reached. However, recent tends show a 
general unwillingness to reach a compromise from both the European Commission and 
arbitral tribunals. In return, the European Commission has systematically supported Member 
States in seeking to set-aside arbitral awards and encouraged the continued termination of 
intra-EU BITs. This has not however stopped investors from invoking their BIT rights.  For 
example, decisions on four investor-state arbitral disputes under an intra-EU BIT have been 
recently rendered against the Czech Republic;  Anglia Auto Accessories, Busta , WNC Factoring 
(all March 2017) and A11Y (February 2017) and the European Commission appeared as 
amicus curiae to question the issue of jurisdiction.135 Although Anglia Auto and Busta cases 
were dismissed on merits, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce arbitral tribunals rejected 
the argument that the UK-Czech Republic BIT did not apply following the latter’s accession 
to the EU. Furthermore, the tribunals argued that EU acquis does not offer most protections 
found in BITs therefore the intra-EU BITs could not have been superseded by virtue of 
having similar subject matter. Nonetheless, the tribunals referred to the 15 year sunset clause 
in the UK-Czech Republic BIT, stating that even if the treaty had been terminated on Czech 
Republic’s accession to the single market, it would not invalidate the 15 year extension thus 
making the treaty valid and applicable in the present dispute.  
Similarly, in 2015 A11Y filed its claim accusing the Czech Republic of breaching the 
expropriation provisions of the UK-Czech Republic BIT and the arbitral tribunal subsequent 
upheld its jurisdiction over the matter despite objection from the respondent State.136 In 
addition, the final award in a claim by WNC Factoring, another British company, against the 
Czech Republic was rendered by a Permanent Court of Arbitration arbitral tribunal on 22 
February 2017 (eventually rejected on merits). In dismissing the Czech Republic’s objection 
to its jurisdiction, the tribunal noted that other tribunals have considered and consistently 
rejected the argument that intra-EU BITs constitute a violation of EU acquis arguing that 
both systems of law are not in conflict and do not offer the same procedural and substantive 
protections to investors. The tribunal however recognised that conflict is not the final resolve 
rather the European Commission may reconsider its inflexible position the future. Overall, 
these four recent decisions show a consistent effort by the tribunals to uphold BIT protection 
over EU acquis; which is rather remarkable for an area of law often criticised for its lack of 
consistency.  
The future of intra-EU BITs appears even bleaker in light of the recent intimations by EU 
Member States on adhering-to the European Commission’s calls to terminate their intra-EU 
BITs. For example, on 24 March 2017, Law No. 18/2017 approving the termination of BITs 
between Romania and other EU Member States came into force. The law targets 22 BITs 
entered with Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Greece, Finland, 
France, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, UK, Portugal, Netherlands, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Hungary. These terminations will be achieved either 
by consent through agreements with contracting States or unilaterally through 
denunciations.137 Based on the accompanying explanatory notes, Romania took this decision 
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because of the infringement proceedings brought by the European Commission in June 2015 
and in a bid to avoid future investor-state proceedings like those brought by Micula. 
On that background, it appears that the European Commission has sawed the seeds for the 
termination of intra-EU BITs and a number of events in the next two years could determine 
the fate of these BITs. First, although little has progressed in the five infringement cases that 
included Romania, the European Commission may consider taking the next step by bringing 
the cases formally before the CJEU, if investor-state arbitral claims continue. Secondly, the 
European Commission remains silent on counter proposals in the Non-Paper, which includes 
the creation of a separate court for intra-EU investment disputes. If taken forward, this could 
offer a pathway from international arbitral tribunals without the destruction the BIT regime 
in the EU. Thirdly, most BITs contain sunset clauses; twenty years in the case of Romania’s 
BITs with Germany, the UK, and France and Sweden, and fifteen years with Bulgaria 
Finland, Netherlands and Luxembourg. Although Romania, and other terminating states may 
shorten the length of the post-termination investment protection, it cannot be done 
unilaterally as consent of the other contracting party is needed. Thus, an immediate end to 
the intra-EU BIT saga is unlikely.  
Fourthly, the ICSID award against Romania which the European Commission ordered the 
respondent State not to pay for conflicting with EU state aid law remains unsettled. The 
investor has challenged the decision before the CJEU’s first instance, this judgement and 
subsequent appeals will offer more clarity on the enforcement of ICSID awards within the 
EU. The first instance judgment is expected sometime in 2018. Similarly, the European 
Commission is awaiting the outcome of the Achmea (Eureko) case which the German 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU 
on whether or not Achmea could rely on the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT and enforce an award 
of 20 million Euros. The judgment is also expected in 2018. The CJEU’s preliminary ruling 
is likely to end the legal uncertainty European investors currently face over their intra-EU 
BITs. If the CJEU confirms the European Commission’s position, the policy on intra-EU BIT 
would need to be reconsidered in order to create a dispute settlement procedure that serves 
investors’ interests without breaching their EU obligations. It is expected that arbitral 
tribunals will thoroughly scrutinise the CJEU’s decision and from there determine a more 
harmonious way forward.  However, after a decade of war against intra-EU BITs, it is very 
unlikely that the European Commission would abandon its intra-EU BIT termination stance 
in favour of dialogue. Thus, a grand finale is on the horizon. 
7. Conclusion and final remarks  
In September 2016, the European Commission issued its reasoned opinion to the five 
infringing states. If the mentioned states fail to comply with the trajectory recommended by 
the European Commission, cases could be brought before the CJEU, forcing the non-abiding 
members into judicial submission. This marked nearly a decade since the European 
Commission began its clampdown on intra-EU BITs due to concerns over their applicability 
and conformity with EU acquis. By March 2017, Romania joining several other States such 
as Poland and Czech Republic, commenced with the termination of their intra-EU BITs. 
These trends raise two questions: i) what are the implications for international investment 
law on a whole, especially at a time when its mandate is under increased scrutiny? Although 
highly relevant, this question was not addressed in this paper, rather the paper focused on the 
implications of the termination for EU investors; ii) what factors are hampering the 
relationship between EU acquis and BITs, and what does the future hold for intra-EU BITs 
in light of the increased terminations? In answering the second question, it emerged that 
although intra-EU BITs were not widely used in the first years of enlargement, since 2007, 
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there has been a renewed impetus from investors to invoke their treaty rights under the BIT. 
This made the once theoretical problems of incompatibility very practical indeed as evidenced 
in cases such as Eureko, Eastern Sugar, and Electrabel. For example, the Micula final award 
produced an outcome that the European Commission considers to be incompatible with EU 
acquis because it constitutes illegal state aid. As a result, the European Commission argues 
that intra-EU BITs undermine the single market by sometimes operating contrary to EU 
acquis and creating an environment of differential rights that favours some investors which 
is tantamount to discrimination. On those grounds, the European Commission believes intra-
EU BITs should be terminated insofar as the matters under the BITs fall within EU 
competence. Although the European Commission accepts that BITs are applicable to disputes 
whose facts arose before a Member State’s accession to the EU, they still expect tribunals to 
respect the primacy of EU acquis in such cases. Similarly, if the facts of the dispute took place 
after the State’s accession, the European Commission expects the BIT to have no effect, as 
the matter falls within EU competence. Essentially, the European Commission narrowly 
recognises the jurisdiction of international tribunals over intra-EU BITs.  
However, arbitral tribunals have consistently dismissed the arguments made by the European 
Commission. First, that BITs are automatically terminated by the prevalence of EU acquis. 
The tribunals responded that the BIT were not terminated thus Member States have to follow 
the relevant procedure of terminating them under the VCLT. Secondly, tribunals have 
consistently rejected the argument that the TFEU and BITs govern the same subject matter, 
this in accordance with Article 59 VCLT.  They further argue that even though there are 
overlaps between the protections provided, there is no reason not to apply them parallel 
Thirdly, tribunals have rejected the argument that an arbitration clause is not compatible 
with EU acquis in accordance with Article 30 VCLT. The tribunals responded that EU acquis 
does not prohibit investment arbitration this is why BITs are not incompatible under Article 
30 VCLT. Thus, the provisions in the BIT could be applied without breaching EU acquis. 
Some tribunals recognised that although BIT provisions such as investor-state arbitration 
could amount to a breach of the non-discrimination provisions under EU acquis, a state should 
not be permitted to justify breaching its BIT rights in order to uphold its EU obligations. 
Thus, we are faced with a stalemate which threatens the future of intra-EU BITs.   
 
